

PX5601 - The Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century

View Online



[1]

Andrew, C.M. and Boulton, E. 1985. Secret Service: the making of the British intelligence community. Guild Publishing.

[2]

Barnett, C. and Boulton, E. 1991. Engage the enemy more closely: the Royal Navy in the Second World War. W. W. Norton.

[3]

Barnett, C. and Boulton, E. 1991. Engage the enemy more closely: the Royal Navy in the Second World War. W. W. Norton.

[4]

Bartlett, C. J. 1972. The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70. Macmillan.

[5]

Beeler, J.F. 2003. Birth of the battleship: British capital ship design, 1870-1881. Caxton Editions.

[6]

Beesly, Patrick 1977. Very special intelligence: the story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939-1945. Hamilton.

[7]

Bell, A.C. 1937. A history of the blockade of Germany and of the countries associated with her in the Great War: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 1914-1918. The Naval and Military Press Ltd.

[8]

Bell, Christopher M. 2015. Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic 'Air Gap'. *Journal of Military History*. 79, 3 (2015), 691–719.

[9]

Bell, Christopher M. and Elleman, Bruce A. 2003. *Naval mutinies of the twentieth century: an international perspective*. Frank Cass.

[10]

Bell, C.M. 2013. *Churchill and sea power*. Oxford University Press.

[11]

Bell, C.M. 2013. *Churchill and sea power*. Oxford University Press.

[12]

Bell, C.M. 2013. *Churchill and sea power*. Oxford University Press.

[13]

Bell, C.M. 2013. *Churchill and sea power*. Oxford University Press.

[14]

Bell, C.M. 2013. *Churchill and seapower*. Churchill and seapower. Oxford University Press.

160–194.

[15]

Bell, C.M. 2017. Churchill and the Dardanelles. Oxford University Press.

[16]

Bell, C.M. 2016. Contested Waters: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era. *War in History*. 23, 1 (Jan. 2016), 115–126. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344515595330>.

[17]

Bell, C.M. 2013. On standards and scholarship: a response to Nicholas Lambert. *War in History*. 20, 3 (Jul. 2013), 381–409. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344513483069>.

[18]

Bell, C.M. 2015. Sentiment vs strategy: British naval policy, Imperial defence, and the development of Dominion Navies, 1911–14. *The International History Review*. 37, 2 (Mar. 2015), 262–281. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2014.900817>.

[19]

Bell, C.M. 2011. Sir John Fisher's naval revolution reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the admiralty, 1911–1914. *War in History*. 18, 3 (Jul. 2011), 333–356. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344511401489>.

[20]

Bell, C.M. 2015. The myth of a naval revolution by proxy: Lord Fisher's influence on Winston Churchill's naval policy, 1911–1914. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. (Mar. 2015), 1–21. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005449>.

[21]

Bell, C.M. 2015. The myth of a naval revolution by proxy: Lord Fisher's influence on Winston Churchill's naval policy, 1911–1914. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. (Mar. 2015),

1–21. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005449>.

[22]

Bell, C.M. 2005. The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny. *War in History*. 12, 1 (Jan. 2005), 75–92. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1191/0968344505wh312oa>.

[23]

Bell, C.M. and ProQuest (Firm) 2012. *Churchill and sea power*. Oxford University Press.

[24]

Bell, C.M. and ProQuest (Firm) 2012. *Churchill and sea power*. Oxford University Press.

[25]

Bell, C.M. and ProQuest (Firm) 2000. *The Royal Navy, seapower and strategy between the wars*. Macmillan Press Limited.

[26]

Benbow, T. 2011. *British naval aviation: the first 100 years*. Ashgate Pub. Co.

[27]

Benbow, T. 2011. *British naval aviation: the first 100 years*. Ashgate Pub. Co.

[28]

Benbow, T. 2018. The Royal Navy and sea power in British strategy, 1945–55. *Historical Research*. 91, 252 (May 2018), 375–398. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.12216>.

[29]

Benbow, Tim 2011. British naval aviation: the first 100 years. Ashgate Pub. Co.

[30]

Boyer, P.S. and Dubofsky, M. 2001. The Oxford companion to United States history. Oxford University Press.

[31]

Brodhurst, Robin 2000. Churchill's anchor: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, OM, GCB, GCVO. Leo Cooper.

[32]

Brooks, J. 2015. Preparing for Armageddon: gunnery practices and exercises in the Grand Fleet prior to Jutland. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. (Mar. 2015), 1-18.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005446>.

[33]

Brooks, J. 2016. The Battle of Jutland. Cambridge University Press.

[34]

Brooks, John 2005. Dreadnought gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: the question of fire control. Routledge.

[35]

Carew, A. 1979. The invergordon mutiny, 1931: long-term causes, organisation and leadership. *International Review of Social History*. 24, 02 (Aug. 1979).
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859000006027>.

[36]

Carew, A. 1981. The lower deck of the Royal Navy 1900-1939: the Invergordon Mutiny in perspective. Manchester University Press.

[37]

Christopher M. Bell 2001. The 'Singapore Strategy' and the Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z. *The English Historical Review*. 116, 467 (2001).

[38]

Christopher McKee Sober Men and True. Harvard University Press.

[39]

Churchill, R.S. and Gilbert, M. 1971. Winston S. Churchill: Vol.3: 1914-1916. Heinemann.

[40]

Churchill, W. 2007. The world crisis, 1911-1918: with an additional chapter on the Battle of the Marne. Penguin.

[41]

Clews, G.T. 2010. Churchill's dilemma: the real story behind the origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign. Praeger.

[42]

Cobb, S. 2013. Preparing for blockade, 1885-1914: naval contingency for economic warfare . Ashgate.

[43]

Conley, M.A. 2009. From Jack Tar to Union Jack: representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870-1918. Manchester University Press.

[44]

Coogan, J.W. 1981. The end of neutrality: United States, Britain and maritime rights 1899-1915. Cornell University Press.

[45]

Coogan, J.W. 2015. The short-war illusion resurrected: the myth of economic warfare as the British Schlieffen Plan. *Journal of strategic studies*. (May 2015), 1-20.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005451>.

[46]

Corbett, J.S. et al. 2003. Naval operations: Vol. II. The Naval & Military Press.

[47]

Corbett, J.S. 2003. Naval operations: Vol. III. The Naval & Military Press.

[48]

Corbett, Julian Stafford 2004. Principles of maritime strategy. Dover Publications.

[49]

Cumming, A.J. 2010. The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain. Naval Institute Press.

[50]

Cumming, A.J. 2010. The warship as the ultimate guarantor of Britain's freedom in 1940*. *Historical Research*. 83, 219 (Feb. 2010), 165-188.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2007.00451.x>.

[51]

Davison, R.L. 2016. The challenges of command: the Royal Navy's executive branch officers, 1880-1919. Routledge.

[52]

Dunley, R. 2017. Invasion, raids and army reform: the political context of 'flotilla defence', 1903-5. *Historical Research*. 90, 249 (Aug. 2017), 613-635.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.12188>.

[53]

Dunley, R. 2015. Sir John Fisher and the policy of strategic deterrence, 1904-1908. *War in History*. 22, 2 (Apr. 2015), 155-173. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344514521126>.

[54]

Dyndal, G.L. 2012. Land based air power or aircraft carriers?: a case study of the British debate about maritime air power in the 1960s. Ashgate Pub. Co.

[55]

Edgerton, D. 2006. *Warfare state: Britain, 1920-1970*. Cambridge University Press.

[56]

Epkenhans, M. 2008. *Tirpitz: architect of the German high seas fleet*. Potomac Books.

[57]

Epstein, K.C. 2015. Scholarship and the ship of state: rethinking the Anglo-American strategic decline analogy. *International Affairs*. 91, 2 (Mar. 2015), 319-331.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12237>.

[58]

Ereira, A. 1981. *The Invergordon mutiny: a narrative history of the last great mutiny in the Royal Navy and how it forced Britain off the Gold Standard in 1931*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[59]

Ereira, Alan 1981. *The Invergordon mutiny: a narrative history of the last great mutiny in the Royal Navy and how it forced Britain off the Gold Standard in 1931*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[60]

Fairbanks, Jr., C.H. 1991. The origins of the Dreadnought revolution: a historiographical essay. *The International History Review*. 13, 2 (1991), 246–272.

[61]

Farquharson-Roberts, M. 2009. The Mutiny: A Failure of the Royal Navy's Internal Communications. *The RUSI Journal*. 154, 2 (Apr. 2009), 104–107.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840902965828>.

[62]

Field, Andrew 2006. *Royal Navy strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939: preparing for war against Japan*. Frank Cass.

[63]

Fisher, J.A.F. 1956. *Fear God and dread nought: the correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, Volume II: Years of power, 1904-1914*. Jonathan Cape.

[64]

Fisher, J.A.F. 1960. *The papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher: Volume I*. Navy Records Society.

[65]

Fisher, J.A.F. 1964. *The papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher: Volume II*.

[66]

Franklin, G.D. 1998. A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION: BRITAIN'S OVER ESTIMATION OF ASDIC'S CAPABILITIES IN THE 1930s. *The Mariner's Mirror*. 84, 2 (Jan. 1998), 204–214.

DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.1998.10656689>.

[67]

Franklin, G.D. 2004. THE ORIGINS OF THE ROYAL NAVY'S VULNERABILITY TO SURFACED NIGHT U-BOAT ATTACK 1939-40. *The Mariner's Mirror*. 90, 1 (Jan. 2004), 73-84.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2004.10656886>.

[68]

French, D. 1982. *British economic and strategic planning 1905-1915*. Allen & Unwin.

[69]

Friedberg, A.L. 1988. *The weary Titan: Britain and the experience of relative decline, 1895-1905*. Princeton University Press.

[70]

Gardner, W. J. R. 1999. *Decoding history: the battle of the Atlantic and Ultra*. Naval Institute Press.

[71]

Gatzke, Hans W. 1972. *European diplomacy between two wars, 1919-1939*. Quadrangle Books.

[72]

Gibbs, N. H. 1976. *Grand strategy: Vol.1: Rearmament policy*. H.M.S.O.

[73]

Goldrick, J. 2015. *Before Jutland: the naval war in Northern European waters, August 1914-February 1915*. Naval Institute Press.

[74]

Goldstein, E. and Maurer, J. 1994. The Washington Conference, 1921-22: naval rivalry, East Asian stability and the road to Pearl Harbor. Frank Cass.

[75]

Goldstein, Erik and Maurer, John H. 1994. The Washington conference, 1921-22: naval rivalry, East Asian stability and the road to Pearl Harbor. Frank Cass.

[76]

Gordon, G. A. H. and King's College, London 1988. British seapower and procurement between the wars: a reappraisal of rearmament. Macmillan in association with King's College, London.

[77]

Gordon, G. A. H. and King's College, London 1988. British seapower and procurement between the wars: a reappraisal of rearmament. Macmillan in association with King's College, London.

[78]

Gordon, G.A.H. 2012. The rules of the game: Jutland and British naval command. Naval Institute Press.

[79]

Gough, B.M. 2010. Historical dreadnoughts: Arthur Marder, Stephen Roskill and battles for naval history. Seaforth Pub.

[80]

Grimes, S. 2010. The Baltic and Admiralty war planning, 1906-1907. Journal of Military History. 74, 2 (2010), 407-437.

[81]

Grimes, S.T. 2012. Strategy and war planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918. Boydell.

[82]

Grove, E. 2017. The Jutland Paradox: A keynote address. *The Mariner's Mirror*. 103, 2 (Apr. 2017), 168–174. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2017.1304698>.

[83]

Grove, E. 1987. *Vanguard to Trident: British naval policy since World War II*. Naval Institute Press.

[84]

Hackmann, W. 1984. *Seek & strike: sonar, anti-submarine warfare and the Royal Navy 1914-54*. H.M.S.O.

[85]

Hackmann, Willem 1984. *Seek & strike: sonar, anti-submarine warfare and the Royal Navy 1914-54*. H.M.S.O.

[86]

Haggie, P. 1981. *Britannia at Bay: the defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931-1941*. Clarendon Press.

[87]

Hall, Christopher 1987. *Britain, America and arms control, 1921-37*. Macmillan.

[88]

Hall, Christopher 1987. *Britain, America and arms control, 1921-37*. Macmillan.

[89]

Halpern, P.G. 1971. The Mediterranean naval situation 1908-1914. Harvard University Press.

[90]

Hamill, I. 1980. Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924â1929. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 11, 02 (Sep. 1980).
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463400004471>.

[91]

Hamilton, C.I. 2011. The making of the modern admiralty: British naval policy-making 1805-1927. Cambridge University Press.

[92]

Hammond, R. 2017. An enduring influence on imperial defence and grand strategy: British perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935–1943. *The International History Review*. 39, 5 (Oct. 2017), 810–835. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1280520>.

[93]

Hammond, R. 2017. An enduring influence on imperial defence and grand strategy: British perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935–1943. *The International History Review*. 39, 5 (Oct. 2017), 810–835. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1280520>.

[94]

Hammond, R. 2013. British Policy on Total Maritime Warfare and the Anti-Shipping Campaign in the Mediterranean, 1940â1944. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 36, 6 (Dec. 2013), 789–814. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.719196>.

[95]

Hampshire, E. and ProQuest (Firm) 2013. From east of Suez to the eastern Atlantic: British naval policy, 1964-70. Ashgate.

[96]

Hennessy, P. and Jinks, J. 2016. *The silent deep: the Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945*. Penguin Books.

[97]

Hennessy, P. and Jinks, J. 2016. *The silent deep: the Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945*. Penguin Books.

[98]

Hessler, G. and Great Britain. Ministry of Defence (Navy) 1989. *The U-Boat war in the Atlantic 1939-1945*. HMSO.

[99]

Hines H. Hall III 1976. The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Britain, 1934-1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. *The Historical Journal*. 19, 2 (1976), 477-499.

[100]

Hines, J. 2008. Sins of omission and commission: a reassessment of the role of intelligence in the Battle of Jutland. *Journal of Military History*. 72, 4 (2008), 1117-1153.

[101]

Hull, I.V. 2014. *A scrap of paper: breaking and making international law during the Great War*. Cornell University Press.

[102]

Imlay, T.C. and Toft, M.D. 2006. The fog of peace and war planning: military and strategic planning under uncertainty. *The fog of peace and war planning: military and strategic planning under uncertainty*. Routledge. 126-138.

[103]

Jackson, A. 2006. *The Royal Navy and the Indian ocean region since 1945*. The RUSI

Journal. 151, 6 (Dec. 2006), 78–82. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840608522863>.

[104]

Jellicoe, N. 2016. Jutland: the unfinished battle. Seaforth Publishing.

[105]

John Buckley 1993. Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic 1939-45. Journal of Contemporary History. 28, 1 (1993), 143–161.

[106]

John D. Fair 1987. The Norwegian Campaign and Winston Churchill's Rise to Power in 1940: A Study of Perception and Attribution. The International History Review. 9, 3 (1987), 410–437.

[107]

Johnman, L. and Murphy, H. 2005. 'THE FIRST FLEET VICTORY SINCE TRAFALGAR': THE BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, MARCH 1941. The Mariner's Mirror. 91, 3 (Jan. 2005), 436–453. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2005.10656960>.

[108]

Jon Tetsuro Sumida 1992. 'The best laid plans': the development of British battle-fleet tactics, 1919-1942. The international history review. 14, 4 (1992).

[109]

Kennedy, G. ed. 2016. Britain's war at sea, 1914-1918: the war they thought and the war they fought. Britain's war at sea, 1914-1918: the war they thought and the war they fought . Routledge. 87–109.

[110]

Kennedy, Greg et al. 1997. Far-flung lines: essays on imperial defence in honour of Donald

Mackenzie Schurman. Frank Cass.

[111]

Kennedy, Paul M. 1991. The rise and fall of British naval mastery. The rise and fall of British naval mastery. FontanaPress. 315–352.

[112]

Kennedy, P.M. 1979. The war plans of the great powers, 1880-1914. The war plans of the great powers, 1880-1914. Allen and Unwin. 118–132.

[113]

Lambert, Andrew D. 2009. Admirals: the naval commanders who made Britain great. Faber.

[114]

Lambert, Andrew D. 2009. Admirals: the naval commanders who made Britain great. Faber.

[115]

Lambert, N. 2015. Righting the scholarship: the battle-cruiser in history and historiography. The Historical Journal. 58, 01 (Mar. 2015), 275–307.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X14000314>.

[116]

Lambert, N. 2004. Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution 1. Journal of Strategic Studies. 27, 2 (Jun. 2004), 272–297.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/0140239042000255922>.

[117]

Lambert, N.A. 1995. Admiral Sir John Fisher and the concept of Flotilla defence, 1904-1909. The Journal of Military History. 59, 4 (1995), 639–660.

[118]

Lambert, N.A. 1995. British naval policy, 1913-1914: financial limitation and strategic revolution. *The Journal of Modern History*. 67, 3 (1995), 595–626.

[119]

Lambert, N.A. 2012. On standards: a reply to Christopher Bell. *War in History*. 19, 2 (Apr. 2012), 217–240. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344511432977>.

[120]

Lambert, N.A. 'Our bloody ships' or 'our bloody system'? Jutland and the loss of the battle cruisers, 1916. *Journal of Military History*. 62, 1, 29–55.

[121]

Lambert, N.A. 2012. *Planning Armageddon: British economic warfare and the First World War*. Harvard University Press.

[122]

Lambert, N.A. 2012. *Planning Armageddon: British economic warfare and the First World War*. Harvard University Press.

[123]

Lambert, N.A. and Navy Records Society (Great Britain) 2001. *The submarine service, 1900-1918*. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society.

[124]

Lambert, N.A. and Navy Records Society (Great Britain) 2001. *The submarine service, 1900-1918*. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society.

[125]

Levy, J. 2002. LOST LEADER: ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR CHARLES FORBES AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR. *The Mariner's Mirror*. 88, 2 (Jan. 2002), 186–195.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2002.10656840>.

[126]

Levy, James P. 2003. *The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War II*. Palgrave Macmillan.

[127]

Levy, J.P. 2012. Royal Navy fleet tactics on the eve of the second World War. *War in History*. 19, 3 (Jul. 2012), 379–395. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344512440655>.

[128]

Levy, J.P. 2012. The Development of British Naval Aviation: Preparing the Fleet Air Arm for War, 1934–1939. *Global War Studies*. 9, 2 (Sep. 2012), 6–38.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.5893/19498489.09.02.01>.

[129]

Llewellyn-Jones, M. 2006. *The Royal Navy and anti-submarine warfare, 1917-49*. Routledge.

[130]

Llewellyn-Jones, M. 2006. *The Royal Navy and anti-submarine warfare, 1917-49*. Routledge.

[131]

Llewellyn-Jones, M. and ProQuest (Firm) 2006. *The Royal Navy and anti-submarine warfare, 1917-49*. Routledge.

[132]

Lowe, Peter 1977. *Great Britain and the origins of the Pacific War: a study of British policy in East Asia, 1937-1941*. Clarendon Press.

[133]

Lumby, E.W.R. and Navy Records Society 1970. Policy and operations in the Mediterranean, 1912-14. Navy Records Society.

[134]

Macintyre, D. 1964. The battle for the Mediterranean. Batsford.

[135]

Mackay, R.F. 1973. Fisher of Kilverstone. Clarendon Press.

[136]

Mackay, R.F. 1970. The Admiralty, the German navy, and the redistribution of the British fleet, 1904-1905. *The Mariner's Mirror*. 56, 3 (Jan. 1970), 341-346.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.1970.10658551>.

[137]

Macleod, J. 2004. Gallipoli: making history. F. Cass.

[138]

Mahnken, T.G. et al. eds. 2016. Arms races in international politics: from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. *Arms races in international politics: from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century*. Oxford University Press. 21-40.

[139]

Maiolo, J.A. 1999. Deception and intelligence failure: Anglo-German preparations for U-boat warfare in the 1930s. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 22, 4 (Dec. 1999), 55-76.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399908437769>.

[140]

Maiolo, J.A. 2014. Did the Royal Navy Decline between the Two World Wars? *The RUSI Journal*. 159, 4 (Jul. 2014), 18–24. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2014.946689>.

[141]

Maiolo, J.A. 1998. *The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: a study in appeasement and the origins of the Second World War*. Palgrave Macmillan.

[142]

Maiolo, J.A. 1998. *The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: a study in appeasement and the origins of the Second World War*. Palgrave Macmillan.

[143]

Maiolo, Joseph A. 2010. *Cry havoc: how the arms race drove the world to war, 1931-1941*. Basic Books.

[144]

Marder, A. 1970. The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36. *The American Historical Review*. 75, 5 (Jun. 1970). DOI:<https://doi.org/10.2307/1844481>.

[145]

Marder, A.J. ed. 1956. *Fear God and dread nought: the correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, Volume II: Years of power, 1904-1914*. Jonathan Cape.

[146]

Marder, A.J. 2013. *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919, Vol. 1: The road to war, 1904-1914*. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919, Vol. 1: The road to war, 1904-1914. Naval Institute Press. 105–150.

[147]

Marder, A.J. 2013. *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era*,

1904-1919, Vol. 1: The road to war, 1904-1914. Naval Institute Press.

[148]

Marder, A.J. 2013. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919, Vol. 2: The war years to the eve of Jutland, 1914-1916. Naval Institute Press.

[149]

Marder, A.J. 2014. From the dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919, Volume III: Jutland and after : May to December 1916. Seaforth Publishing.

[150]

Marder, A.J. 2014. From the dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919, Volume IV: 1917: year of crisis. Naval Institute Press.

[151]

Marder, A.J. 1972. The anatomy of British sea power: a history of British naval policy in the pre-dreadnought era, 1880-1905. Cass.

[152]

Marder, A.J. 1972. The anatomy of British sea power: a history of British naval policy in the pre-dreadnought era, 1880-1905. Cass.

[153]

Marder, Arthur J. 1974. From the Dardanelles to Oran: studies of the Royal Navy in war and peace, 1915-1940. Oxford University Press.

[154]

Marder, Arthur J. 1972. Winston is back: Churchill at the Admiralty, 1939-40. Longman.

[155]

Martin, C. 2005. The 1907 naval war plans and the second Hague peace conference: a case of propaganda 1. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 28, 5 (Oct. 2005), 833–856.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500393993>.

[156]

Martin, C. 2009. The declaration of London: a matter of operational capability. *Historical Research*. 82, 218 (Nov. 2009), 731–755.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x>.

[157]

Maurer, J.H. 2012. 'Winston has gone mad': Churchill, the British Admiralty, and the rise of Japanese naval power. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 35, 6 (Dec. 2012), 775–797.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.654648>.

[158]

Maurer, J.H. 2012. 'Winston has gone mad': Churchill, the British Admiralty, and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 35, 6 (Dec. 2012), 775–797.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.654648>.

[159]

Maurer, John and Bell, Christopher M. 2013. *At the crossroads between peace and war: the London naval conference in 1930*. U.S. Naval Institute.

[160]

McDermott, J. 1989. 'A needless sacrifice': British businessmen and business as usual in the First World War. *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*. 21, 2 (1989), 263–282.

[161]

McDermott, J. Total war and the merchant state: aspects of British economic warfare against Germany, 1914-16. *Canadian Journal of History*. 21, 1.

[162]

McDermott, J. Trading with the enemy: British business and the law during the First World War. *Canadian Journal of History*. 32, 2.

[163]

McKercher, B. J. C. 1990. *Anglo-American relations in the 1920s: the struggle for supremacy*. Macmillan.

[164]

McKercher, B. J. C. 1984. *The second Baldwin government and the United States, 1924-1929: attitudes and diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press.

[165]

McLaughlin, S. and Jordan, J. 2016. *Jutland: the naval staff appreciation*. Seaforth Publishing, Pen & Sword Books Ltd.

[166]

Moretz, Joseph 2002. *The Royal Navy and the capital ship in the interwar period: an operational perspective*. Routledge.

[167]

Morgan-Owen, D. 2015. A revolution in naval affairs? Technology, strategy and British naval policy in the 'Fisher Era'. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. (May 2015), 1-22.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005440>.

[168]

Morgan-Owen, D.G. 2015. An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North sea strategy, 1912-1914. *War in History*. 22, 4 (Nov. 2015), 478-502.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344514528150>.

[169]

Morgan-Owen, D.G. 2015. Cooked up in the dinner hour? Sir Arthur Wilson's war plan, reconsidered. *The English Historical Review*. (Jun. 2015).
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cev158>.

[170]

Morgan-Owen, D.G. 2014. 'History is a record of exploded ideas': Sir John Fisher and home defence, 1904–10. *The International History Review*. 36, 3 (May 2014), 550–572.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.828645>.

[171]

Morgan-Owen, D.G. 2017. *The fear of invasion: strategy, politics, and British war planning, 1880-1914*. Oxford University Press.

[172]

Morris, A.J.A. 1984. *The scaremongers: the advocacy of war and rearmament 1896-1914*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[173]

Murfett, M.H. 1993. Living in the Past: A Critical Re-examination of the Singapore Naval Strategy, 1918–1941. *War and Society*. 11, 1 (May 1993), 73–103.

[174]

O'Brien, Phillips Payson 1998. *British and American naval power: politics and policy, 1900-1936*. Praeger.

[175]

O'Brien, P.P. 1998. *British and American naval power: politics and policy, 1900-1936*. Praeger.

[176]

O'Brien, P.P. 1998. British and American naval power: politics and policy, 1900-1936. Praeger.

[177]

Offer, A. 1991. The First World War: an agrarian interpretation. Oxford University Press.

[178]

O'Hara, V.P. et al. 2010. On seas contested: the seven great navies of the Second World War. Naval Institute.

[179]

Olson, M. 1963. The economics of the wartime shortage: a history of British food supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II. Duke University Press.

[180]

Osbourne, E.W. Britain's economic blockade of Germany, 1914-1919. Routledge; Reprint edition (31 Oct 2013).

[181]

Ovendale, Ritchie 1994. British defence policy since 1945. Manchester University Press.

[182]

Overlack, P. 1996. German commerce warfare planning for the Australian station, 1900-1914. War and Society. 14, 1 (May 1996), 17-48.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1179/072924796791200898>.

[183]

Overlack, P. 1997. The function of commerce warfare in an Anglo-German conflict to 1914. Journal of Strategic Studies. 20, 4 (Dec. 1997), 94-114.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399708437700>.

[184]

Papastratigakis, N. 2010. British naval strategy: the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Turkish Straits, 1890–1904. *The International History Review*. 32, 4 (Dec. 2010), 643–659. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2010.534597>.

[185]

Papastratigakis, N. 2011. *Russian imperialism and naval power: military strategy and the build-up to the Russo-Japanese War*. I.B. Tauris.

[186]

Patterson, A.T. and Navy Records Society (Great Britain) 1966. *The Jellicoe papers: selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of Scapa, Volume 1: 1893-1916*. Printed for the Navy Records Society.

[187]

Peden, G.C. 2007. *Arms, economics and British strategy: from dreadnoughts to hydrogen bombs*. Arms, economics and British strategy: from dreadnoughts to hydrogen bombs. Cambridge University Press. 98–163.

[188]

Peden, G.C. 1979. *British rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939*. Scottish Academic Press.

[189]

Philbin, T.R. 2014. *Battle of Dogger Bank: the first dreadnought engagement, January 1915*. Indiana University Press.

[190]

Prior, R. 1983. *Churchill's 'World crisis' as history*. Croom Helm.

[191]

Prior, R. 2009. Gallipoli: the end of the myth. Yale University Press.

[192]

Ranft, B. and Navy Records Society (Great Britain) 1989. The Beatty papers: selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, Volume 1: 1902-1918. Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society.

[193]

REDFORD, D. 2011. Collective Security and Internal Dissent: The Navy League's Attempts to Develop a New Policy towards British Naval Power between 1919 and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. *History*. 96, 321 (Jan. 2011), 48-67.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-229X.2010.00506.x>.

[194]

Redford, D. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Service Rivalries in the Battle of the Atlantic. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 32, 6 (Dec. 2009), 899-928.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390903189642>.

[195]

Redford, D. et al. 2014. The Royal Navy: a history since 1900. I.B. Tauris.

[196]

Robinson, D. 2006. Invasion, 1940: the truth about the Battle of Britain and what stopped Hitler. Constable & Robinson.

[197]

Robson, M. 2014. Signals in the sea: the value of Ultra intelligence in the Mediterranean in World War II. *Journal of Intelligence History*. 13, 2 (Jul. 2014), 176-188.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2014.896113>.

[198]

Roksund, A. 2007. *The jeune ecole: the strategy of the weak*. Brill.

[199]

Ropp, T. and Roberts, S.S. 1987. *The development of a modern navy: French naval policy, 1871-1904*. Naval Institute Press.

[200]

Roskill, S. W. 1976. *Naval policy between the wars: 2: The period of reluctant rearmament 1930-1939*. Collins.

[201]

Roskill, S. W. 1954. *The war at sea, 1939-1945: Vol.1: The defensive*. H.M.S.O.

[202]

Roskill, S.W. et al. 1969. *Documents relating to the Naval Air Service: Volume 1: 1908-1918*. Printed for the Navy Records Society.

[203]

Roskill, S.W. 1968. *Naval policy between the wars: 1: The period of Anglo-American antagonism 1919-1929*. Collins.

[204]

Ross, A. 2002. Losing the initiative in mercantile warfare: Great Britain's surprising failure to anticipate maritime challenges to her global trading network in the First World War. *International journal of naval history*. 1, 1 (2002).

[205]

Scammell, C.M. 1997. The royal navy and the strategic origins of the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 20, 2 (Jun. 1997), 92-118.

DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399708437680>.

[206]

Selborne, W.W.P. and Boyce, D.G. 1990. The crisis of British power: the imperial and naval papers of the second Earl of Selborne, 1895-1910. Historians' Press.

[207]

Seligmann, M. 2012. A German preference for a medium-range battle? British assumptions about German naval gunnery, 1914-1915. War in History. 19, 1 (Jan. 2012), 33-48.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344511422310>.

[208]

Seligmann, M. 2010. Intelligence information and the 1909 naval scare: the secret foundations of a public panic. War in History. 17, 1 (Jan. 2010), 37-59.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344509348302>.

[209]

Seligmann, M. and Morgan-Owen, D. Evolution or Revolution? British Naval Policy in the Fisher Era.

[210]

Seligmann, Matthew, S. et al. 2015. The naval route to the abyss: the Anglo-German naval race 1895-1914. The naval route to the abyss: the Anglo-German naval race 1895-1914. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society Publications. 103-154.

[211]

Seligmann, Matthew, S. et al. 2015. The naval route to the abyss: the Anglo-German naval race 1895-1914. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society Publications.

[212]

Seligmann, Matthew, S. et al. 2015. The naval route to the abyss: the Anglo-German naval

race 1895-1914. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society Publications.

[213]

Seligmann, Matthew, S. et al. 2015. The naval route to the abyss: the Anglo-German naval race 1895-1914. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society Publications.

[214]

Seligmann, M.S. 2016. A Great American Scholar of the Royal Navy? The Disputed Legacy of Arthur Marder Revisited. *The International History Review*. (Feb. 2016), 1-15.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1144628>.

[215]

Seligmann, M.S. 2010. A prelude to the reforms of Admiral Sir John Fisher: the creation of the Home Fleet, 1902-3. *Historical Research*. 83, 221 (2010), 506-519.

[216]

Seligmann, M.S. 2012. Britain's great security mirage: the Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian naval threat, 1898-1906. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 35, 6 (Dec. 2012), 861-886. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.699439>.

[217]

Seligmann, M.S. 2017. Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914. *War in History*. (Apr. 2017).
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344516638383>.

[218]

Seligmann, M.S. 2016. Germany's Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy's First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*. 27, 1 (Jan. 2016), 162-182. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2015.1034576>.

[219]

Seligmann, M.S. 2015. Naval History by Conspiracy Theory: The British Admiralty before the First World War and the Methodology of Revisionism. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 38, 7 (Nov. 2015), 966–984. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005443>.

[220]

Seligmann, M.S. 2015. Naval history by conspiracy theory: the British admiralty before the First World War and the methodology of revisionism. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. (Apr. 2015), 1–19. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1005443>.

[221]

Seligmann, M.S. 2008. New weapons for new targets: Sir John Fisher, the threat from Germany, and the building of HMS *Hood* and HMS *Queen Elizabeth*, 1902–1907. *The International History Review*. 30, 2 (Jun. 2008), 303–331. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2008.10415479>.

[222]

Seligmann, M.S. 2018. Rum, sodomy, prayers, and the lash revisited: Winston Churchill and social reform in the Royal Navy, 1900–1915. Oxford University Press.

[223]

Seligmann, M.S. 2016. Strategy and the sea: essays in honour of John B. Hattendorf. *Strategy and the sea: essays in honour of John B. Hattendorf*. N.A.M. Rodger et al., eds. The Boydell Press. 138–147.

[224]

Seligmann, M.S. 2008. Switching horses: the admiralty's recognition of the threat from Germany, 1900–1905. *The International History Review*. 30, 2 (Jun. 2008), 239–258. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2008.10415476>.

[225]

Seligmann, M.S. et al. 2015. The naval route to the abyss: the Anglo-German naval race 1895–1914. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society Publications.

[226]

Seligmann, M.S. 2013. The renaissance of pre-First World War naval history. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 36, 3 (Jun. 2013), 454-479.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.795037>.

[227]

Seligmann, M.S. 2012. *The Royal Navy and the German threat, 1901-1914: admiralty plans to protect British trade in a war against Germany*. Oxford University Press.

[228]

Seligmann, M.S. and Navy Records Society 2007. *Naval intelligence from Germany: the reports of the British naval attachés in Berlin, 1906-1914*. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society.

[229]

Seligmann, M.S. and Navy Records Society 2007. *Naval intelligence from Germany: the reports of the British naval attachés in Berlin, 1906-1914*. Ashgate for the Navy Records Society.

[230]

Seligmann, M.S. and ProQuest (Firm) 2006. *Spies in uniform: British military and naval intelligence on the eve of the first World War*. Oxford University Press.

[231]

Sondhaus, L. 2014. *The Great War at sea: a naval history of the First World War*. Cambridge University Press.

[232]

Sondhaus, L. 2014. *The Great War at sea: a naval history of the First World War*. Cambridge University Press.

[233]

Sumida, J. 2000. Demythologizing the Fisher era: the role of change in historical method. *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*. 59, 1 (2000), 171–182.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1524/mgzs.2000.59.1.171>.

[234]

Sumida, J.T. 2003. A matter of timing: the Royal Navy and the tactics of decisive battle, 1912-1916. *The Journal of Military History*. 67, 1 (2003), 85–136.

[235]

Sumida, J.T. 1979. British capital ship design and fire control in the Dreadnought era: Sir John Fisher, Arthur Hungerford Pollen, and the battle cruiser. *The Journal of Modern History*. 51, 2 (1979), 205–230.

[236]

Sumida, J.T. 2007. 'Expectation, adaptation, and resignation: British battle fleet tactical planning, August 1914-April 1916'. *Naval War College Review*. 60, 3 (2007), 101–122.

[237]

Sumida, J.T. 2014. *In defence of naval supremacy: finance, technology, and British naval policy 1889-1914*. Naval Institute Press.

[238]

Sumida, J.T. 1995. Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: the sources of naval mythology. *The Journal of Military History*. 59, 4 (1995), 619–637.

[239]

Sumida, J.T. 1995. Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: the sources of naval mythology. *The Journal of Military History*. 59, 4 (1995), 619–637.

[240]

Till, G. 2004. Maritime airpower in the interwar period: the information dimension. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 27, 2 (Jun. 2004), 298–323.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/0140239042000255931>.

[241]

Tracy, N. 1997. *The collective naval defence of the Empire, 1900 to 1940*. Published by Ashgate for the Navy Records Society.

[242]

Van der Vat, D. and Boulton, E. 2000. *Standard of power: the Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century*. Hutchinson.

[243]

Vincent P. O'Hara 30AD. *Clash of Fleets: Naval Battles of the Great War, 1914-18*. Naval Institute Press.

[244]

Wark, Wesley K. 1985. *The ultimate enemy: British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939*. Tauris.

[245]

Wells, J. et al. 1994. *The Royal Navy: an illustrated social history, 1870-1982*. Alan Sutton.

[246]

Whalley, P. 2009. The Invergordon mutiny and the national economic crisis of 1931: A media and parliamentary perspective. *Journal for Maritime Research*. 11, 1 (Dec. 2009), 1–23. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2009.9668366>.

[247]

Woodward, L. 1964. *Great Britain and the German navy*. Cass.

[248]

26AD. Able Seamen. Conway; UK ed. edition.

[249]

12AD. Royal Naval Officers from War to War, 1918-1939. AIAA; 1st ed. 2015 edition.